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Abstract. The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies
on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social
dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals’ fitness, usually the basic driving force of
evolution, then quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution is also governed
by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness differences, and can
render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate the effects of selection versus
fluctuations in social dilemmas.
By studying the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable
sensitive to fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging ‘edge of
neutral evolution’ which delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our
results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral regimes.
In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory, where defectors
beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our studies demonstrate
that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to partly resolve social
dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to estimate the role of random drift
in evolutionary dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Individuals of ecological communities permanently face the choice of either cooperating
with each other, or of cheating [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. While cooperation is beneficial for the
whole population and essential for its functioning, it often requires an investment by
each agent. Cheating is then tempting, yielding social dilemmas where defection is the
rational choice that would yet undermine the community and could even lead to ultimate
self-destruction. However, bacteria or animals do not act rationally; instead, the fate
of their populations is governed by an evolutionary process, through reproduction and
death. The conditions under which cooperation can thereby evolve are subject of much
contemporary, interdisciplinary research [2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11].
Evolutionary processes possess two main competing aspects. The first one is
selection by individuals’ different fitness, which underlies adaptation [12, 13, 14] and
is, by neo-Darwinists, viewed as the primary driving force of evolutionary change.
In social dilemmas, defectors exploit cooperators rewarding them a higher fitness;
selection therefore leads to fast extinction of cooperation, such that the fate of the
community mimics the rational one. A large body of work is currently devoted to
the identification of mechanisms that can reinforce cooperative behavior [15], e.g. kin
selection [16, 17], reciprocal altruism [18, 19], or punishment [5, 8, 20]. However, the
evolution of cooperation in Darwinian settings still poses major challenges. The second
important aspect of evolution are random fluctuations that occur from the unavoidable
stochasticity of birth and death events and the finiteness of populations. Neutral
theories emphasize their influence which can, ignoring selection, explain many empirical
signatures of ecological systems such as species-abundance relations as well as species-
area relationships [21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. The importance of neutral evolution for the
maintenance of cooperation has so far found surprisingly little attention [26, 27, 28, 29].
In this Article, we introduce a general concept capable to investigate the effects
of selection versus fluctuations by analyzing extinction events. We focus on social
dilemmas, i.e., we study the effects of Darwinian versus neutral evolution on cooperation
‡. For this purpose, we consider a population that initially displays coexistence of
cooperators and defectors, i.e., cooperating and non-cooperating individuals. After
some transient time, one of both ‘species’ will disappear [23], simply due to directed and
stochastic effects in evolution and because extinction is irreversible: an extinct species
cannot reappear again. The fundamental questions regarding cooperation are therefore:
Will cooperators eventually take over the whole population, and if not, for how long can
a certain level of cooperation be maintained?
We show that the answers to these questions depend on the influence of
stochasticity. For large fluctuations, evolution is effectively neutral, and cooperation
maintained on a long time-scale, if not ultimately prevailing. In contrast, small
stochastic effects render selection important, and cooperators die out quickly if
‡ Within this paper, we use the term ’Darwinian’ to signify evolutionary dynamics mainly driven by
selection, as assumed within the modern synthesis of evolution.
Neutral evolution in social dilemmas 3
Table 1. Different types of social dilemmas. We consider a population of
cooperators and defectors, and describe their interactions in terms of four parameters
T ,R,S and P , see text. Depending on the payoff-differences S − P and T − R, four
qualitatively different scenarios arise.
S − P < 0 S − P > 0
T −R < 0 Coordination game By-product mutualism
T −R > 0 Prisoner’s dilemma Snwodrift game
disfavored. We demonstrate the emergence of an ‘edge of neutral evolution’ delineating
both regimes.
2. Models and Theory
2.1. Social dilemmas
Consider a population of N individuals which are either cooperators C or defectors
D. We assume that individuals randomly engage in pairwise interactions, whereby
cooperators and defectors behave distinctly different and thereby gain different fitness.
The population than evolves by fitness-dependent reproduction and random death, i.e.,
a generalized Moran process [2, 30], which we describe in detail in the next Subsection.
Here we present the different possible fitness gains of cooperators and defectors.
In the prisoner’s dilemma a cooperator provides a benefit b to another individual, at
a cost c to itself (with the cost falling short of the benefit). In contrast, a defector refuses
to provide any benefit and hence does not pay any costs. For the selfish individual,
irrespective of whether the partner cooperates or defects, defection is favorable, as
it avoids the cost of cooperation, exploits cooperators, and ensures not to become
exploited. However, if all individuals act rationally and defect, everybody is, with a
gain of 0, worse off compared to universal cooperation, where a net gain of b− c would
be achieved. The prisoner’s dilemma therefore describes, in its most basic form, the
fundamental problem of establishing cooperation.
We can generalize the above scheme to include other basic types of social
dilemmas [31]. Namely, two cooperators that meet are both rewarded a payoff R,
while two defectors obtain a punishment P. When a defector encounters a cooperator,
the first exploits the second, gaining the temptation T , while the cooperator only gets
the suckers payoff S. Social dilemmas occur when R > P, such that cooperation is
favorable in principle, while temptation to defect is large: T > S, T > P. These
interactions may be summarized by the payoff matrix
C D
C R S
D T P
Hereby, the entries in the upper row describe the payoff that a cooperator obtains when
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Figure 1. Phase space exemplified for the prisoner’s dilemma. The
evolutionary dynamics consists of a Darwinian, directed part caused by selection
of defectors (D) against cooperators (C), and a neutral, undirected part due to
fluctuations. Eventually, only one species survives.
encountering a cooperator C or a defector D, and the entries in the lower row contain
the payoffs for a defector.
Variation of the parameters T ,P,R and S yields four principally different types of
games, see Tab. 1 and Fig. 3. The prisoner’s dilemma as introduced above arises if the
temptation T to defect is larger than the reward R, and if the punishment P is larger
than the suckers payoff S, e.g., R = b−c, T = b, S = −c and P = 0. As we have already
seen above, in this case, defection is the best strategy for the selfish player. Within the
three other types of games, defectors are not always better off. For the snowdrift game
the temptation T is still higher than the reward R but the sucker’s payoff S is larger
than the punishment P. Therefore, cooperation is favorable when meeting a defector,
but defection pays off when encountering a cooperator, and a rational strategy consists
of a mixture of cooperation and defection. Another scenario is the coordination game,
where mutual agreement is preferred: either all individuals cooperate or defect as the
reward R is higher than the temptation T and the punishment P is higher than sucker’s
payoff S. Last, the scenario of by-product mutualism yields cooperators fully dominating
defectors since the reward R is higher than the temptation T and the sucker’s payoff S
is higher than the punishment P. All four situations and the corresponding ranking of
the payoff values are depicted in Tab. 1 and Fig. 3.
2.2. The evolutionary dynamics
We describe the evolution by a generalized Moran process [2, 30], where the population
size N remains constant and reproduction is fitness-dependent, followed by a random
death event.
Let us denote the number of cooperators by NC ; the number of defectors then
reads N − NC . The individuals’ fitness are given by a constant background fitness,
set to 1, plus the payoffs obtained from social interactions. The fitness of cooperators
and defectors thus read fC = 1 + R(NC − 1)/(N − 1) + S(N − NC)/(N − 1) and
fD = 1+T NC/(N−1)+P(N−1−NC)/(N−1), resp.. In the following, we assume weak
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Figure 2. The prisoner’s dilemma. Defectors save the cost c of cooperation
and therefore have a fitness advantage of c compared to cooperators. (A), Exemplary
evolutionary trajectories. A high selection strength, i.e., a high fitness difference c = 0.1
(purple), leads to Darwinian evolution and fast extinction of cooperators, while a small
one, c = 0.001 (green), allows for dominant effects of fluctuations and maintenance of
cooperation on long time-scales. We have used N = 1000 in both cases. (B), The
dependence of the corresponding mean extinction time T on the system size N . We
show data from stochastic simulations as well as analytical results (solid lines) for T ,
starting from equal abundances of both species, for different values of c (see text):
c1 = 0.1 (♦), c2 = 0.01 (◦), c3 = 0.001 (), and c4 = 0.0001 (△). The transition from
the neutral to the Darwinian regime occurs at population sizes N
(1)
e , N
(2)
e , N
(3)
e , and
N
(4)
e . They scale as 1/c: Ne ≈ 2.5/c, as is confirmed by the rescaled plot where the
data collapse onto the universal scaling function G, shown in the inset.
selection, i.e., the payoff coefficients are small compared to the background fitness. Note
that within this limit, the self interactions of individuals are only of minor relevance.
More important, in the case of weak selection, the evolutionary dynamics of the game
depends only on the payoff differences T − R and S − P. The different types of social
dilemmas arising from theses two parameters are listed in Table 1.
In the Moran process, reproduction of individuals occurs proportional to their
fitness, and each reproduction event is accompanied by death of a randomly chosen
individual. As an example, the rate for reproduction of a defector and corresponding
death of a cooperator reads
ΓC→D =
fD
〈f〉
NC
N
N −NC
N
, (1)
whereby 〈f〉 = fCNC/N + fD(1 − NC/N) denotes the average fitness. The time scale
is such that an average number of N reproduction and death events occur in one time
step.
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2.3. Distinguishing Darwinian from neutral evolution: Extinction times
The evolutionary dynamics is intrinsically stochastic. Although defectors may have a
fitness advantage compared to cooperators, the latter also have a certain probability
to increase. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1 for a population of 4 individuals and
the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma. Darwinian evolution, through selection by
individuals’ fitness, points to the ‘rational’ state of only defectors, while fluctuations
oppose this dynamics and can lead to a state of only cooperators. In any case, upon
reaching overall defection or cooperation, the temporal development comes to an end.
One species therefore eventually dies out.
The mean extinction time, i.e., the mean time it takes a population where different
species coexist to eventually become uniform, allows to distinguish Darwinian from
neutral evolution. Consider the dependence of the mean extinction time T on the
system size N . Selection, as a result of some interactions within a finite population, can
either stabilize or destabilize a species’ coexistence with others as compared to neutral
interactions, thereby altering the mean time until extinction occurs. Instability leads
to steady decay of a species, and therefore to fast extinction [28, 29, 32]: The mean
extinction time T increases only logarithmically in the population size N , T ∼ lnN ,
and a larger system size does not ensure much longer coexistence. This behavior can be
understood by noting that a species disfavored by selection decreases by a constant rate.
Consequently, its population size decays exponentially in time, leading to a logarithmic
dependence of the extinction time on the initial population size. In contrast, stable
existence of a species induces T ∼ expN , such that extinction takes an astronomically
long time for large populations [28, 29, 33]. In this regime, extinction only stems from
large fluctuations that are able to cause sufficient deviation from the (deterministically)
stable coexistence. These large deviations are exponentially suppressed and hence the
time until a rare extinction event occurs scales exponentially in the system size N .
An intermediate situation, i.e., when T has a power-law dependence on N ,
T ∼ Nγ, signals dominant influences of stochastic effects and corresponds to neutral
evolution [34, 35, 36]. Here the extinction time grows considerably, though not
exponentially, in increasing population size. Large N therefore clearly prolongs
coexistence of species but can still allow for extinction within biologically reasonable
time-scales. A typical neutral regime is characterized by γ = 1, such that T scales
linearly in the system size N . This corresponds to the case where the dynamics yields
an essentially unbiased random walk in state space. The mean-square displacement
grows linearly in time, with a diffusion constant proportional to N . The absorbing
boundary is thus reached after a time proportional to the system size N . Other values
of γ can occur as well. For example, and as shown later, γ = 1/2 can occur in social
dilemmas (regimes (2) in Fig. 3).
To summarize, the mean extinction time T can be used to classify evolutionary
dynamics into a few fundamental regimes. Darwinian evolution can yield stable and
unstable coexistence, characterized by T ∼ logN and T ∼ expN , resp.. Power law
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dependences, T ∼ Nγ , indicate neutral evolution. Transitions between these regimes
can occur and manifest as crossovers in the functional relation T (N).
2.4. Analytical description
An approximate analytical description, valid for a large number N of interacting
individuals, is possible. The quantity of interest is thereby the probability P (NC , t) of
having NC cooperators at time t. Its time evolution is described by a master equation
specified by transition rates such as (1). For large population sizesN the master equation
can be approximately described within a generalized diffusion approach, where the
fraction x = NC/N of cooperators is considered as a continuous variable. The temporal
development of P (x, t) is then described by a Fokker-Planck equation [37, 38, 27],
∂
∂t
P (x, t) = − ∂
∂x
[α(x)P (x, t)] +
1
2
∂2
∂x2
[β(x)P (x, t)] . (2)
Hereby, α(x) describes the Darwinian of the evolution, due to selection by fitness
differences, and corresponds to the deterministic dynamics d
dt
x = α(x). The second
part, which involves the diffusion term β(x), accounts for fluctuations (to leading order)
and thereby describes undirected random drift. β(x) decreases like 1/N with increasing
population size. For the social dilemmas which we study in this article α and β are
given by,
α(x) = x(1− x) [(S − P)(1− x)− (T −R)x] ,
β(x) =
1
N
x(1− x) [2 + (S − P)(1 − x) + (T −R)x]
≈ 2
N
x(1− x) . (3)
Here, the approximation of β given in the last line is valid since weak selection is
assumed.
The prisoner’s dilemma, specified by T −R = P−S ≡ c > 0 describes the situation
where defectors have a frequency independent fitness advantage fD−fC = c as compared
to cooperators. This scenario is frequently studied in population genetics [37]; we briefly
discuss it in the following. The directed part and diffusion coefficients are given by,
α(x) = − cx(1− x) ,
β(x) =
1
N
x(1 − x) [2− c(1− 2x)] ≈ 2
N
x(1− x) . (4)
With these one can calculate the fixation probability Pfix,C to end up with only
cooperators if starting with an equal fraction of cooperators and defectors. It has already
been calculated in previous work [38, 37] and reads,
Pfix,C =
e−Nc/2 − e−Nc
1− e−Nc . (5)
The probability for fixation of defectors follows as Pfix,D = 1 − Pfix,C. Within the
Darwinian regime (Nc→∞) defectors fixate (Pfix,D = 1), whereas for the neutral regime
(Nc→ 0) both strategies have the same chance of prevailing (Pfix,C = Pfix,D = 1/2).
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The fixation probability gives no information about the typical time needed for
extinction of one of the two species. However, this time is important to determine
whether extinction happens within the time scale of observation. We turn to this
question in the following.
2.5. Analytical calculation of mean extinction times
The above analytical description, in form of the Fokker-Planck equation (2), can be
employed for computing the mean extinction time T (x). The latter refers to the mean
time required for a population initially consisting of a fraction x = NC/N of cooperators
to reach a uniform state (only either cooperators or defectors). It is given as solution
to the corresponding backward Kolmogorov equation [39, 40],[
α(x)
∂
∂x
+
1
2
β(x)
∂2
∂x2
]
T (x) = −1 , (6)
with appropriate boundary conditions. This equation can be solved by iterative
integration [39]. In detail, the mean extinction time, T = T (x = 1/2), if starting
with an equal fraction of cooperators x = 1/2 is given by
T = 2
[(∫ 1/2
0
du/Ψ(u)
)∫ 1
1/2
dy/Ψ(y)
∫ y
0
dzΨ(z)/β(z)
− [
(∫ 1
1/2
du/Ψ(u)
)∫ 1/2
0
dy/Ψ(y)
∫ y
0
dzΨ(z)/β(z)
]
×
[∫ 1
0
du/Ψ(u)
]−1
, (7)
where Ψ(x) is given by Ψ(x) = exp
(∫ x
0
dy 2α(y)/β(y)
)
. We have performed these
integrals for the general Moran process and show the results in the following.
For the special case of the prisoner’s dilemma, specified by T −R = P−S ≡ c > 0,
(frequency independent fitness advantage), Eq. (7) can be solved exactly. The solution
reads,
T =
1
N
[
Pfix,C
{− ln(cN)− γ + Ei (cN/2) + ecN [Ei (−cN)− Ei (−cN/2)]}
+ Pfix,D
{
ln (cN) + γ − Ei (−cN/2) + e−cN [Ei (cN/2)− Ei (cN)]} ] ,(8)
where Ei(x) denotes the exponential integral Ei(x) =
∫
x−1 exp(x)dx and γ ≈ 0.577
is the Euler Mascheroni constant. Pfix,C and Pfix,D denote the fixation probabilities
of cooperators and defectors, given by Eq. (5). The analytical solution of the mean
extinction time as a function of N is shown and compared to stochastic simulations in
Fig. 2. For a further discussion of T (N) (Eq. 8) and its impact on evolutionary dynamics
we defer the reader to section 3. Here, just note that the asymptotic behavior, of Ei (x)
is given by Ei(x) ≈ log(|x|) + γ + x for x → 0, and Ei(x) ≈ ± log(|x|) + exp(x)/x for
x→ ±∞. With this, the well known asymptotic solutions for high and low population
size N , T = log(2)N and T ∼ logN are obtained.
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For general social dilemmas with arbitrary payoff values T ,P,R,S, we need to
rely on some approximations. Using the drift and diffusion coefficient given by Eq. (3)
we now linearize the fraction α/β, i.e. we write α(x)/β(x) ≈ g(x − x∗). Hereby
x∗ = (S − P)/(S − P + T − R) denotes the fixed point of the deterministic dynamics,
where α(x∗) = 0, and g = −N(S − P + T − R)/2. As an example, in the situation
S −P + T −R > 0, |x∗| ≫ 1/√g, and |1−x∗| ≫ 1/√g, we obtain the mean extinction
time,
T =
N ln(2)
g
{erfi [√g (1− x∗)] + erfi (√gx∗)}−1 ×
×
{
erfi (−√gx∗) [−F (g (1− x∗)) + F (g (1/2− x∗))]
− erfi (√g (1− x∗)) [F (g (1/2− x∗))−F (g (x∗))]
+ erfi (
√
g (1/2− x∗)) [F (g (1− x∗))− F (g (x∗))]
}
(9)
Hereby, erfi(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
dy exp(y2) denotes the complex error function, and
F(x) ≡ xF1,1;3/2,2(x) involves a generalized hypergeometric function. For graphical
representation of Eq.(8) see Fig. 4A (upper branch). As before, the correct asymptotic
behavior can also be calculated for this case. Note that the asymptotic behavior of F(x)
is given by F(x) ≈ x for x → 0 and F(x) ≈ erfi(√x) − log(|x|)/2 − 1 for x → ±∞.
For small population size, the mean extinction time scales again like T = log(2)N . For
asymptotically large system sizes the scaling depends on the value of the fixed point
x∗. For an internal fixed point x∗ ∈ (0, 1), as arises in the snowdrift game, T scales as
expected like T ∼ exp(N).
In the Results Section, we analyze the properties of the analytical form of the mean
extinction time, Eqs. (8) and (9), together with numerical simulations, and demonstrate
how it defines an emerging edge of neutral evolution.
2.6. Edges of neutral evolution
In the Results section, we show that the mean extinction time, Eq. (9), exhibits different
regimes of neutral and Darwinian dynamics. Here, we provide further information on
how the boundaries between these regimes can be obtained analytically.
For this purpose, we further approximate the dynamics. Let us, firstly, focus on the
edge of the regime where T ∼ N emerges. We note that, before unavoidable extinction
of one species occurs, a quasi-stationary distribution may form around the fixed point
x∗. Following the generic behavior of an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, its shape is
approximately Gaussian [41]. Its width is given by w ∼√1/|g|. x∗ and g are specified in
the preceding section. Now, for small width, w ≪ 1, the Darwinian evolution dominates
the behavior, meaning T ∼ ln(N) or T ∼ exp(N). In contrast, if w ≫ 1 the dynamics
is essentially a random walk, and T ∼ N emerges. The edge of neutral evolution
therefore arises at w ∼ 1. Remembering that g is given by g = −N(S −P + T −R)/2,
it follows that the edge between both regimes for S − P, T − R > is described by
(T − R) = d/N − (S − P). Numerical simulations yield a good agreement with this
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Figure 3. Social dilemmas. Depending on the sign of the payoff differences
T − R and S − P , a prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift game, by-product mutualism or
coordination game arises. Two regimes of neutral evolution, (1) and (2) shown in
grey, intervene two Darwinian regimes, (3) and (4), depicted in white. Coexistence of
cooperators and defectors is lost after a mean time T which discriminates the distinct
regimes: In (1), we encounter T ∼ N , while T ∼ √N emerges in (2), T ∼ expN
in (3), and T ∼ lnN in (4). In the prisoner’s dilemma and the coordination game,
neutral evolution can thus maintain cooperation at a much longer time than Darwinian
evolution. The edges of neutral evolution, red and blue curves, scale as 1/N (see text).
We therefore show them depending on (T − R)N and (S − P)N , where they adopt
universal shapes.
prediction. As discussed later (see Fig. 2), they reveal that the crossover between the
two regimes is remarkably sharp. The constant d which specifies the exact position of
the crossover can therefore be estimated as d ≈ 5. It follows that the regime of T ∼ N
therefore corresponds to the square circumscribed by straight lines connecting the points
(T −R,S − P) = (5/N, 0), (0,−5/N), (−5/N, 0), (0, 5/N) as shown in Fig. 3.
A similar argument allows to determine the crossover from the other neutral regime,
with T ∼ √N , to the Darwinian regimes. The neutral regime emerges if the fixed
point x∗ is close to the boundaries, such that w ∼ |x∗| or w ∼ |1 − x∗| denotes the
crossover to the Darwinian regimes. From these relations, if follows that the shapes
of this second neutral regime are described by T − R ≈ −(S − P) + (S − P)2N and
S−P ≈ −(T −R)+(T −R)2N . The proportionality constant has again been estimated
from numerical simulations. From the latter, we have also found that the parabolic
curves constitute a valid approximation to this second edge of neutral evolution.
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3. Results
We employ the analytical expression, Eqs. (8) and (9), for the mean extinction time,
as well as computer simulations, to show how regimes of Darwinian and neutral
evolution can be distinguished. We demonstrate that neutral evolution can maintain
cooperation on much longer time-scales than Darwinian, even if cooperation has a fitness
disadvantage.
3.1. Prisoner’s dilemma
We start with the special case of the prisoner’s dilemma where defectors have a frequency
independent fitness advantage c compared to cooperators. The fixation probabilities,
Eq. (5), provides first insight into the dynamics. When the population size N is
large and selection by fitness differences dominates the dynamics, i.e., when cN ≫ 1,
the probability that defectors ultimately take over the whole population tends to 1.
Cooperators are guaranteed to eventually die out. This is the regime of Darwinian
evolution; the resulting outcome equals the one of rational agents. However, in the
situation of small populations and small fitness difference, i.e., cN ≪ 1, both cooperators
and defectors have an equal chance of 1/2 of fixating. In this regime, fluctuations have an
important influence and dominate the evolutionary dynamics, leaving fitness advantages
without effect, evolution is neutral.
Further quantification of the regimes of Darwinian and neutral evolution is feasible
by considering the mean extinction time, given by Eq. (8). It is compared to stochastic
simulations in Fig. 2 B for different costs (fitness advantages) c. The excellent agreement
confirms the validity of our analytic approach. Regarding the dependence of T on the
population size N and the fitness difference c, the mean extinction time can be cast into
the form,
T (N, c) = TeG (N/Ne) , (10)
with a scaling function G. Te and Ne are characteristic time scales and population
sizes depending only on the selection strength c. Analyzing its properties, it turns
out that G increases linearly in N for small argument N/Ne ≪ 1, such that T ∼ N ,
c.f. Fig. 2 B. This is in line with our classification scheme and the expected behavior. It
indicates [28, 29] that for small system sizes, N ≪ Ne, evolution is neutral. Fluctuations
dominate the evolutionary dynamics while the fitness advantage of defectors does not
give them an edge, c.f. Fig. 2 A. Indeed, in this regime, cooperators and defectors
have an equal chance of surviving, see Eq. (5). The T ∼ N behavior shows that the
extinction time considerably grows with increasing population size; a larger system
size proportionally extends the time cooperators and defectors coexist. As expected, a
very different behavior emerges for large system sizes, N/Ne ≫ 1, where G increases
only logarithmically in N , and therefore T ∼ lnN , again in correspondence with our
classification scheme of the mean extinction time. The extinction time remains small
even for large system sizes, and coexistence of cooperators and defectors is unstable.
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Indeed, in this regime, selection dominates over fluctuations in the stochastic time
evolution and quickly drives the system to a state where only defectors remain, c.f. Fig. 2
A. The evolution is Darwinian.
As described above, the regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution emerge for
N/Ne ≪ 1 and N/Ne ≫ 1, respectively. The cross-over population size Ne delineates
both scenarios. Further analyzing the universal scaling function G, as well as comparison
with data from stochastic simulations, see Fig. 2 B, reveals that the transition at Ne is
notably sharp. We therefore refer to it as the edge of neutral evolution.
The crossover time Te and the crossover population size Ne which define the edge
of neutral evolution decrease as 1/c in increasing cost c. This can be understood by
recalling that the cost c corresponds to the fitness advantage of defectors and can thus
be viewed as the selection strength. The latter drives the Darwinian dynamics which
therefore intensifies when c grows, and the regime of neutral evolution diminishes. On
the other hand, when the cost of cooperation vanishes, evolution becomes neutral also
for large populations. Indeed, in this case, defectors do not have a fitness advantage
compared to cooperators; both do equally well. Our approach now yields information
about how large the cost may be until evolution changes from neutral to Darwinian.
From numerical inspection of G we find that neutral evolution is present for cN < 2.5,
and Darwinian evolution takes over for cN > 2.5. This resembles a condition previously
derived by Kimura, Ohta, and others [38, 42, 43] for frequency independent fitness
advantages. The edge of neutral evolution arises at Ne = 2.5/c and Te = 2.5/c.
As a consequence we note that, though selection pressure clearly disfavors
cooperation, our results reveal that the ubiquitous presence of randomness
(stochasticity) in any population dynamics opens a window of opportunity where
cooperation is facilitated. In the regime of neutral evolution, for cN < 2.5, cooperators
have a significant chance of taking over the whole population when initially present.
Even if not, they remain on time-scales proportional to the system size, T ∼ N , and
therefore considerably longer than in the regime of Darwinian evolution, where they
extinct after a short transient time, T ∼ lnN .
3.2. General social dilemmas
Let us now consider the influence of fluctuations within the more general form of social
dilemmas, given by the parameters T ,P,R,S. We employ the analytical form of the
mean extinction time, Eq. (9), as well as results from stochastic simulations. Examples
for different paths in parameter space are shown in Fig. 4. Again, the approximative
analytical results agree excellently with numerics.
Concering the dependence of the mean extinction time on the population size,
different behaviors emerges, reflecting the different regimes of evolutionary dynamics.
Two regimes of Darwinian evolution form, depicted white in Fig. 3. The first one occurs
within the snowdrift game, where the extinction time increases exponentially in the
population size, T ∼ expN , and coexistence of cooperators and defectors is stable.
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Figure 4. Transitions and universal scaling. We show the rescaled mean
extinction time, T/Te, depending on N/Ne, for different transitions emerging in
social dilemmas (c.f. Fig. 3). (A), Transition from the neutral regime (1), where
T ∼ N emerges, to the Darwinian regimes (3) (T ∼ expN) as well as (4) (T ∼
lnN). (B), From neutral dynamics in regime (2) (T ∼
√
N) to the Darwinian
regimes (3) (T ∼ expN) and (4) (T ∼ lnN). (C), Transition between the two
neutral regimes (1) (T ∼ N) and (2) (T ∼ √N). Analytical calculations are
shown as black lines, and symbols have been obtained from stochastic simulations
for large (△), medium (◦), and small (♦) values of S − P and/or T − R. The
data collapse onto universal curves reveals the accuracy of the scaling laws. In
(A), we have used S − P = T − R ∈ {−0.1,−0.01,−0.001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}, while
S − P ∈ {−0.1,−0.01,−0.001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1}, T − R = 1 in (B), and S − P = 0,
T −R ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1} in (C).
The second regime comprises parts of the prisoner’s dilemma, the coordination game,
and by-product mutualism. There, either defectors or cooperators eventually survive,
and the mean extinction time of the other strategy is small, and obeys a logarithmic
law T ∼ lnN . We have encountered this regime already in the particular case of the
prisoner’s dilemma specified by T −R = P − S ≡ c > 0. These two Darwinian regimes
are separated by two regimes of neutral evolution, shown in grey in Fig. 3. First, for
small N and small differences in the payoffs (i.e., around the point where the four
types of games coincide) a T ∼ N behavior emerges. Second, at the lines where the
snowdrift game turns into the prisoner’s dilemma resp. by-product mutualism, the mean
extinction time increases as a square-root in the population size, T ∼ √N .
Similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, we now aim at identifying the edge of neutral
evolution, i.e., the crossover from the Darwinian regimes to the regimes of neutral
evolution. We have calculated the boundaries of both neutral regimes, T ∼ N and
T ∼ √N analytically, see Methods section 2.6. They are described by straight lines for
the first one and by parabola-shaped lines for the second one, see Fig. 3.
Both edges of neutral evolution scale proportional to the system size N . Therefore,
while increasing the system size changes the payoff parameters where the crossovers
appear, the shape and relations of the different regimes are not altered. Concerning the
dependence of the edges of neutral evolution on the characteristic strength of selection s,
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meaning the average contribution of the fitness-dependent payoff to the overall fitness,
different scaling laws arise. For the crossover from the neutral regime T ∼ N to the
other regimes, Te and Ne scale as 1/s. In contrast, a scaling law Ne ∼ 1/s2 for crossovers
between the neutral regime with T ∼ √N and the Darwinian regimes emerges. This
different scaling behavior arises, for example, for T − R = 1 and varying s = S − P as
shown in Fig. 4 B.
4. Discussion
Cooperation is often threatened by exploitation and therefore, although beneficial,
vulnerable to extinction. In evolutionary dynamics, this mechanism comes in through
selection by individuals’ fitness, the driving force of Darwinian evolution. However,
evolution also possesses stochastic aspects. Employing a standard formulation of social
dilemmas, we have shown that fluctuations can support cooperation in two distinct
ways. First, they can lead cooperators to fully take over the population. Second,
neutral evolution considerably increases the time at which cooperators and defectors
coexist, i.e., at which a certain level of cooperation is maintained. To emphasize the
importance of the second point, we note that in real ecological systems the rules of the
dynamics themselves change due to external [44] or internal [45] influences, setting an
upper limit to the time-scales at which evolution with constant payoffs, as we study here,
applies. In particular, these times can be shorter than the times that would be needed
for extinction of either cooperators or defectors, such that it may be less important to
look at which of both would ultimately remain, but what the time-scales for extinction
are.
Quantitatively, we have shown the emergence of different Darwinian and neutral
regimes. In the Darwinian regime of the prisoner’s dilemma, cooperators are guaranteed
to become extinct; the same is true for the second neutral regime, where T ∼ √N .
However, in the other neutral regime, with T ∼ N , a random process determines whether
cooperators or defectors prevail. Cooperators may therefore take over due to essentially
neutral evolution. Moreover, even if cooperators eventually disappear, they remain for a
considerably longer time in the neutral regimes than in the Darwinian regime. Indeed, in
the regimes of neutral evolution, coexistence of cooperators and defectors is maintained
for a mean time T obeying T ∼ N resp. T ∼ √N . For medium and large population
sizes, this time exceeds by far the time T ∼ lnN at which cooperation disappears
in the Darwinian regimes of the prisoner’s dilemma or of the coordination game (if
defectors happen to dominate in the latter case). Neutral evolution can therefore
maintain cooperation on a much longer time-scale than Darwinian evolution. This effect
is relevant as the neutral regimes considerably extend into the prisoner’s dilemma as
well as the cooperation game region. There, a form of neutrally maintained cooperation
evolves.
Our results have been obtained by applying a general concept based on extinction
times that allows to classify evolutionary dynamics into regimes of Darwinian and
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neutral character, separated by an emerging edge of neutral evolution. Apart from the
social dilemmas under consideration here, we believe that our quantitative analytical
approach can be versatilely applied to disentangle the effects of selection and fluctuations
in various ecological situations where different species coexist [46, 47, 48, 49, 50].
Encouraged by our findings, we expect such studies to reveal further unexpected effects
of fluctuations on ecology and evolution.
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